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PER CURIAM. This case, erroneously entitled below "The Case of
the Fictitious Taxpayer," raises two questions: (1) Is one who pays a
tax a payer of a tax? (2) Is a payer of a tax a taxpayer? Our answer to
each question is yes, and we reject the district court's unnecessary
qualifications.
On these two questions, this Court, stimulated by the sparkling wit
of Professor Bittker, has sunk into bemuddled fuddles and befuddled
muddles, described in the district court's opinion. In response to ridicule from the segments of the society that retain a sense of smell for
intellectual quicksand, we now cut ourselves loose from the ridiculous
refinements of the district court's opinion, and we adopt the cleancut
proposition that one who pays a tax is a taxpayer, whether or not the
winds of chance have blown the taxpayer to an airport, whether or not
the taxpayer is a citizen, and whether or not the taxpayer is reimbursed.
Furthermore, we adhere to our holding, discussed in the district court's
opinion, that one who bears any part of the burden of a tax is a taxpayer; that holding renders irrelevant most of the district court's
opinion, as the district court should have recognized, for anyone who
spends money in the United States is likely to bear some of the burden
of one or more excise taxes.
The district court's opinion is seriously mistaken in assuming that
standing of a taxpayer is equivalent to the "public action" advanced
by Professor Jaffe. We held in Flast that a taxpayer may have standing
to challenge federal disbursements, but we did not hold that citizenship alone is enough for standing. To show that taxpayers and citizens
are not equivalents, we shall now review our holdings in the three
Chiang cases.
A Chinese woman had three sons. The first, Chiang Kai Wun, was
born in China. The second, Chiang Kai Tu, was born in the United
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States while his mother was a student at Wellesley College. The third,
Chiang Kai Tre, was born in China after his mother returned.
Chiang Kai Wun started selling hot cakes in New York City when he
was fourteen; they sold like hot cakes, and he branched out into gold
cakes, uranium cakes, nuclear cakes, and mutual cakes, with enterprises
a hundred times the size of General Motors. When New York City
spent federal funds for parochial schools, Chiang Kai Wun asked his
lawyers to get a declaratory judgment that the expenditures violated
the establishment clause. This Court followed Professor Jaffe, who had
written that "The citizen, as the prime political unit of the democracy,
should be the plaintiff."' Chiang Kai Wun was not a citizen. That he
had a few millions at stake as the biggest taxpayer in the world did not
matter, for Jaffe had written that "the likely size of the tax bill, and
what is more to the point, the impact of the allegedly illegal expenditure on the plaintiff's own tax liability are irrelevaht." 2
The lawyers then sued on behalf of Chiang Kai Tu, who had s'eht
his entire life in an institution for the mentally retarded in the interior of China. The government lawyers produced conclusive evidence
that the institutidn had a rigid policy of buying only local products
and that Chiang Kai Tu had never heard of New York City, of schools,
or of taxes. But the Court, following Jaffe, held that the test of standing
was citizenship, that the plaintiff was a citizen, and that, quoting Jaffe,
"the impact" on the plaintiff was "irrelevant." If the impact was irrelevant, the lack of impact was irrelevant, the Court reasoned.
Meantime, Chiang Kai Tie, the bright brother, simiultaneously
headed the espionage systems of nine countries, including the United
States and the Soviet Union, but was exposed in 1992, during the closing days of the Vietnam war, when liquid computer tape leaked out of
his flask. He sought judicial review of the order to execute him. The
government lawyers conceded that he had been denied due process in
67 ways, but they asserted lack of standing. Although the Jaffe view
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Bittker, this Court overlooked the further Jaffe position that "Perhaps there ig a good
case for retaining the taxpayer action as a supplement where there is in fact a waste of
funds." In this aspect, Professor Jaffe does not reject the taxpayer action, and in this
aspect he and Professor Bittker are evidently taking opposite positions, to the extent that
Bittker is rejecting the taxpayer action. Not only do Bittker and Jaffe differ irithat
Jaffe properly recognizes the need for allowing taxpayers' actions even if citizens have
standing, but they also differ in that Jaffe courageously takes an affirmative position about
standing while Bittker is wholly negative. We think that if Bittker would try to solve
the problem of standing, instead of limiting himself to ridiculing those who do try, including this Court, he would quickly discover that his own ridicule could be fully applied
to his affirmative product, whatever it might be.
2 Id. at 484.
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that the "impact" on the plaintiff is "irrelevant" to standing was limited to cases challenging public disbursements, this Court decided that
if that view was valid for such cases, it should be valid for other problems of standing. Said the Court: "The test of standing is citizenship,
not the impact on the plaintiff. This plaintiff is not a citizen, and the
impact of the governmental action on him is irrelevant. Therefore, he
lacks standing to challenge the order that he be executed."
The unanimity of commentators and editorial writers has convinced
us that we should reexamine our position, and we have done so. We
now see that the "impact" of execution is not "irrelevant" to the
standing of one who is about to be executed. Indeed, the impact seems
to be the key factor.
Accordingly, we overrule all three Chiang decisions. A citizen who
has nothing at stake lacks standing. A citizen or noncitizen who has
something at stake has standing.
Judgment affirmed.

